Tags › Denial of Service
Massive DDoS attacks on VoIP Providers and simulated DDoS testing
Published on Sep 24, 2021 in denial of service, voip security
VoIP.ms and other VoIP providers under DDoS attack
At the time of writing, a major VoIP provider called VoIP.ms is under a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack since over a week. As a result, they are unable to serve their customers with everyone and their dog complaining that they cannot connect to VoIP.ms’s SIP servers as well as other resources. At the same time, someone claiming to be part of the REvil ransomware group is blackmailing the provider.
…DEMO - An overview of the VoIP and RTC offensive security toolset, SIPVicious PRO
Published on May 25, 2021 in sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, fuzzing, denial of service, training, devops
We pushed out a video that introduces the basics of SIPVicious PRO by demonstrating some of the attack tools and showing the building blocks for automating security testing of VoIP and WebRTC applications and infrastructure.
What follows is a transcript of the video.
Introduction
Hello, I’m Sandro Gauci from Enable Security. In this video, I’d like to show you what we have been working on, SIPVicious PRO! Let’s start by introducing the tools. SIPVicious PRO is a command-line toolset, meant to test the security of realtime communications, which includes Voice over IP as well as WebRTC infrastructure.
…TADSummit Asia 2021 talk about SIPVicious Pro and the Demo Server
Published on May 18, 2021 in sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, demo server, sipvicious oss, fuzzing, denial of service, training, devops
TADSummit is a great event where people from different backgrounds that are somehow involved in communications, contribute in various ways. I, personally, always look forward to see what’s coming up in the next TADSummit event. At the moment, TADSummit Asia presentations are currently being released on a daily basis on the main site. And last week, the presentation that I prepared was published!
In the previous TADSummit, I had presented about why we need to bring an offensive approach to RTC security. In this one, I introduce our contributions to the space, i.e. SIPVicious OSS, SIPVicious PRO and the demo server.
…VoIPmonitor: static builds lack memory corruption protections
Published on Mar 15, 2021 in voipmonitor, buffer overflow, denial of service, memory corruption, security advisory
- Fixed versions: N/A
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2021-04-voipmonitor-staticbuild-memory-corruption-protection/
- VoIPmonitor Security Advisory: none
- Tested vulnerable versions: 27.5
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2021-02-10 & 2021-02-13
- Enable Security advisory: 2021-03-15
Description
The binaries available for download at https://www.voipmonitor.org/download are built without any memory corruption protection in place. The following is output from the tool hardening-check:
hardening-check voipmonitor:
Position Independent Executable: no, normal executable!
Stack protected: no, not found!
Fortify Source functions: unknown, no protectable libc functions used
Read-only relocations: no, not found!
Immediate binding: no, not found!
Stack clash protection: unknown, no -fstack-clash-protection instructions found
Control flow integrity: unknown, no -fcf-protection instructions found!
When stack protection together with Fortify Source and other protection mechanisms are in place, exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities normally results in a program crash instead of leading to remote code execution. Most modern compilation systems create executable binaries with these features built-in by default. When these features are not used, attackers may easily exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, to run arbitrary code. In this advisory we will demonstrate how a buffer overflow reported in a separate advisory, could be abused to run arbitrary code because of the lack of standard memory corruption protection in the static build releases of VoIPmonitor.
…VoIPmonitor: buffer overflow in live sniffer
Published on Mar 15, 2021 in CVE-2021-1000005, voipmonitor, buffer overflow, denial of service, memory corruption, security advisory
- Fixed versions: 27.6
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2021-03-voipmonitor-livesniffer-buffer-overflow/
- VoIPmonitor Security Advisory: none, changelog references fixes at https://www.voipmonitor.org/changelog-sniffer
- Tested vulnerable versions: 27.5
- References: CVE-2021-1000005
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2021-02-10
- Triaged: 2021-02-12
- Fix provided for testing: 2021-02-15
- VoIPmonitor release with fix: 2021-02-15
- Enable Security advisory: 2021-03-15
Description
A buffer overflow was identified in the VoIPmonitor live sniffer feature. The description variable in the function save_packet_sql is defined as a fixed length array of 1024 characters. The description is set to the value of a SIP request or response line. By setting a long request or response line VoIPmonitor will trigger a buffer overflow. The affected code is:
sngrep: stack overflow via malformed SDP connection address
Published on Nov 20, 2020 in sngrep, denial of service, security advisory
- Fixed versions: 1.4.8
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2020-04-sngrep-malformed-connection-address/
- Reproduction tools: https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2020-04-sngrep-malformed-connection-address
- Tested vulnerable versions: 1.4.7
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2020-09-16
- sngrep confirmed issue + patch: 2020-09-16
- sngrep release with fix: 2020-11-10
- Enable Security advisory: 2020-11-20
Description
When sending a specially crafted SIP message with a malformed SDP connection address, sngrep crashes due to a stack overflow. The following backtrace was generated during our tests:
(gdb) bt
#0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6)
at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50
#1 0x00007ffff7ced859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
#2 0x00007ffff7d583ee in __libc_message (
action=action@entry=do_abort,
fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff7e8207c "*** %s ***: terminated\n")
at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:155
#3 0x00007ffff7dfa9ba in __GI___fortify_fail (
msg=msg@entry=0x7ffff7e82064 "stack smashing detected")
at fortify_fail.c:26
#4 0x00007ffff7dfa986 in __stack_chk_fail () at stack_chk_fail.c:24
#5 0x0000555555560651 in sip_parse_msg_media (msg=0x7ffff0046c60,
payload=<optimized out>) at sip.c:740
#6 0x3131313131313131 in ?? ()
#7 0x3131313131313131 in ?? ()
The issue was originally discovered during OpenSIPIt; tracked down and analyzed for severity and impact later.
…sngrep: buffer overflow via malformed SDP media type
Published on Nov 20, 2020 in sngrep, buffer overflow, denial of service, security advisory
- Fixed versions: 1.4.8
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2020-03-sngrep-malformed-media-type/
- Reproduction tools: https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2020-03-sngrep-malformed-media-type
- Tested vulnerable versions: 1.4.7
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2020-09-16
- sngrep confirmed issue + patch: 2020-09-16
- sngrep release with fix: 2020-11-10
- Enable Security advisory: 2020-11-20
Description
When sending a specially crafted SIP message with a malformed SDP media type, sngrep crashes due to a buffer overflow. The following backtrace was generated during our tests:
#0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50
#1 0x00007ffff7ced859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
#2 0x00007ffff7d583ee in __libc_message (action=action@entry=do_abort,
fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff7e8207c "*** %s ***: terminated\n")
at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:155
#3 0x00007ffff7dfa9ba in __GI___fortify_fail (
msg=msg@entry=0x7ffff7e82012 "buffer overflow detected") at fortify_fail.c:26
#4 0x00007ffff7df9256 in __GI___chk_fail () at chk_fail.c:28
#5 0x00007ffff7df8b36 in __strcpy_chk (dest=0x7ffff00306f2 "",
src=0x7ffff79fcad1 'A' <repeats 200 times>..., destlen=destlen@entry=15)
at strcpy_chk.c:30
#6 0x0000555555563f72 in strcpy (__src=<optimized out>, __dest=<optimized out>)
at /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:90
#7 media_set_type (media=<optimized out>, type=<optimized out>) at media.c:65
#8 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
The issue was originally discovered during OpenSIPIt; tracked down and analyzed for severity and impact later.
…How doing QA testing for SIPVicious PRO led to an Asterisk DoS
Published on Nov 10, 2020 in fuzzing, sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, denial of service
Executive summary (TL;DR)
While heavily testing SIPVicious PRO for bugs, we encountered an unexpected crash in Asterisk. We reported this to the Asterisk team, who issued a fix. (Update February 4, 2026: SIPVicious PRO is an internal tool and is not sold or licensed.)
How the Asterisk crash was found
We test our software as much as we can because, like any other software, ours contains bugs too! When it comes to SIPVicious PRO, one of our quality assurance tests is to run it against instances of Asterisk and Kamailio and check for expected results. Our test suite loads these servers in a docker environment and automatically runs SIPVicious PRO against these targets. During these tests, we look for crashes, race conditions and other unchecked states that we might have failed to address in our own code. We do this through various methods, one of which is to observe exit codes in SIPVicious PRO that indicate the result of the test.
…Asterisk: crash via INVITE flood over TCP
Published on Nov 6, 2020 in CVE-2020-28327, asterisk, denial of service, security advisory
- Fixed versions: 13.37.1, 16.14.1, 17.8.1, 18.0.1
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2020-02-asterisk-tcp-invite-crash/
- Reproduction tools: https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2020-02-asterisk-tcp-invite-crash
- Asterisk Security Advisory: https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2020-001.html
- References: AST-2020-001, CVE-2020-28327
- Tested vulnerable versions: 17.5.1, 17.6.0
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2020-08-31
- Triaged: 2020-09-01
- Fix provided for testing: 2020-10-29
- Asterisk release with fix: 2020-11-05
- Enable Security advisory: 2020-11-06
Description
When an Asterisk instance is flooded with INVITE messages over TCP, it was observed that after some time Asterisk crashes due to a segmentation fault. The backtrace generated after the crash is:
…Kamailio: off-by-one heap overflow
Published on Mar 19, 2018 in CVE-2018-8828, kamailio, heap overflow, denial of service, security advisory
- Authors:
- Alfred Farrugia alfred@enablesecurity.com
- Sandro Gauci sandro@enablesecurity.com
- Fixed versions: Kamailio v5.1.2, v5.0.6 and v4.4.7
- References: CVE-2018-8828
- Enable Security Advisory: https://www.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES2018-05-kamailio-heap-overflow/
- Kamailio Security Advisory: https://www.kamailio.org/w/2018/03/kamailio-security-announcement-tmx-lcr/
- Tested vulnerable versions: 5.1.1, 5.1.0, 5.0.0
- Timeline:
- Report date: 2018-02-10
- Kamailio confirmed issue: 2018-02-10
- Kamailio patch: 2018-02-10
- Kamailio release with patch: 2018-03-01
- Enable Security advisory: 2018-03-19
Description
A specially crafted REGISTER message with a malformed branch or From tag triggers an off-by-one heap overflow.
Impact
Abuse of this vulnerability leads to denial of service in Kamailio. Further research may show that exploitation leads to remote code execution.
…